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ABSTRACT 
A major focus of finance is reducing risk on investments, a goal 
commonly achieved by dispersing the risk among numerous investors. 
Sometimes, however, risk dispersion can cause investors to underestimate 
and under-protect against risk. Risk can even be so widely dispersed that 
rational investors individually lack the incentive to monitor it. This Article 
examines the market failures resulting from risk dispersion and analyzes 
when government regulation may be necessary or appropriate to limit 
these market failures. The Article also examines how such regulation 
should be designed, including the extent to which it should limit risk 
dispersion in the first instance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Risk dispersion, which is widespread in modern finance, is intended to 
reduce risk from the standpoint of any given investor.
1
 Although 
conventional wisdom has been that risk dispersion is unambiguously good, 
this Article argues that it may not work in the face of hidden correlations 
and that it produces social costs that arise from weak monitoring. As a 
result, investors and other market participants underestimate and under-
protect against risk, with few worrying about where dispersed risk goes or 
whether risk dispersion can impact the stability of financial markets. This 
“marginalization” of risk appears to have contributed, at least in part, to 
the recent financial crisis.
2
  
 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A. 
 2. Cf. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 24; 
sources cited infra note 30; see also Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank, Speech 
Before the Fifth ECB Central Banking Conference (Nov. 13, 2008) (“[T]he root cause of the 
[financial] crisis was the overall and massive undervaluation of risk across markets, financial 
institutions and countries.”). Commentators have advanced other explanations of the causes of the 
financial crisis. See, e.g., MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40173, CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40173_20100409.pdf. I have 
argued that the causes of the financial crisis more generally can be conceptualized within a framework 
consisting of conflicts, complacency, complexity, and a type of tragedy of the commons. See Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 373 (2008); Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the Subprime Financial 
Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549 (2009). Running throughout these causes is another cause, cupidity; but 
because greed is so ingrained in human nature and so intertwined with the other causes, it adds little 
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This Article begins by examining the reasons for risk dispersion. The 
Article then analyzes why risk dispersion can, and sometimes does, 
marginalize risk. Finally, the Article examines whether government should 
attempt to regulate risk dispersion and, if so, how such regulation should 
be designed. 
A. Dispersing Risk  
Why does modern finance disperse risk? Finance can be broadly 
divided into debt finance and equity finance.
3
 This Article focuses 
primarily on debt finance,
4
 though its overall principles should 
theoretically have application to equity finance.
5
 A major focus of debt 
finance (hereinafter, references to “finance” mean debt finance) is 
reducing risk on investments in order to reduce the interest rate on 
borrowed funds—thereby reducing a borrower’s cost of funds.6 Under 
 
 
insight to view it separately. This Article uses the foregoing conceptual framework to help examine 
and analyze risk marginalization. 
 3. See generally Allen N. Berger & George F. Udell, The Economics of Small Business 
Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 613, 626–27 (1998). 
 4. In its most basic form, debt finance involves the lending of money—which is repayable at a 
later date—from a person who has surplus funds (a “lender”) to a person that needs funds (a 
“borrower”). See Bernice Kotey, Debt Financing and Factors Internal to the Business, 17 INT’L 
SMALL BUS. J. 11, 14–15 (1999) (discussing basics of debt finance). Loans are typically evidenced by 
a promissory note, the most basic form of investment security. Cf. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 
56, 65 (1990) (using the family resemblance test to determine whether a financial instrument is a note 
and thus should be categorized as a security). Although conceptually identical, lending in a securities 
market context is usually described as the investment of money by a person who has surplus funds (an 
“investor”) in investment securities issued by a person that needs funds (the “issuer”). See JAMES D. 
COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2009). If a loan is made at arm’s 
length (a “commercial” transaction), the lender will negotiate with the borrower for a return on its 
investment. A lender naturally will seek a higher return, and a borrower will want to pay a lower 
return. The return is usually called interest, and the rate of return is usually called the interest rate. See, 
e.g., IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 13 (1974); STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS 
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 193 (Michele Janicek ed., 2008). Another common term for interest is 
“yield.” Interest compensates the lender not only for its cost of funds and the time value of money 
(including a profit factor), but also for the risk that the borrower may delay or even fail in repaying the 
loan. See MILES LIVINGSTON, MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 12–14 (Maureen Wilson ed., 1990). In 
a competitive lending market, negotiated interest rates tend to be inversely related to the riskiness of 
the loan: the less risky the loan, the lower the interest rate. Id. at 15. This assumes that all other factors, 
including the loan’s maturity, are the same. 
 5. GORDON J. ALEXANDER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENTS 1–2 (2001) (observing 
that debt and equity investments share many common principles). 
 6. See CHARLES W. SMITHSON, MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK 25 (1998). Another focus of 
finance is increasing a lender’s rate of return by making riskier investments. Cf. Prasanna Gai & 
Nicholas Vause, Measuring Investors’ Risk Appetite 5–6 (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 283, Nov. 
2005) (discussing how the “risk appetite” of investors varies). Different investors have different “risk 
profiles,” so some investors prefer low-risk (and thus low-return) investments whereas other investors 
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modern finance theory, investors can protect themselves from risk by 
diversifying their investments.
7
 To the extent risk is negatively correlated, 
or uncorrelated, with market risk, the randomly distributed risks of a 
diversified investment portfolio theoretically “would tend to cancel out, 
producing a riskless portfolio.”8  
Investment risk, however, is often at least somewhat correlated with the 
market in which the investment is made.
9
 For example, even if a particular 
company produces a uniquely valuable product, the company’s stock price 
will be adversely affected in a collapse of the market in which that stock is 
traded. It therefore is desirable not only to diversify investments within a 
market but also to diversify investments across markets ideally seeking 
markets that are themselves uncorrelated with the risk of other markets.
10
 
Risk dispersion is an important way to diversify investments both within 
and across markets.
11 
 
To understand why risk dispersion can diversify investments within 
markets, consider the relatively simple examples of loan syndication and 
sales of loan participations. Assume that a bank’s customer needs to 
borrow $10 million. If the bank makes that loan, it would take on $10 
million (plus interest) of investment risk, because the borrower may fail to 
repay.
12
 A bank typically will reduce this risk by dispersing it, either by 
joining a lending syndicate whereby other banks share in making the loan, 
or by selling interests (“participations”) in its loan to other banks.13 For 
 
 
want high-return (but thus high-risk) investments. See, e.g., GLENN YAGO, JUNK BONDS: HOW HIGH 
YIELD SECURITIES RESTRUCTURED CORPORATE AMERICA 3–5 (1991) (discussing junk bonds as high-
risk, but high-return, investments); Pierre Casado et al., Gaining the Edge: Why Do Entrepreneurial 
French Companies Choose High Yield?, LATHAM & WATKINS (Dec. 6, 2006), available at 
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1715_1.pdf. 
 7. See, e.g., R. GLENN HUBBARD, MONEY, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, AND THE ECONOMY 326 
(4th ed. 2002) (observing that “diversification reduces the overall credit risk”). 
 8. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 446 (6th ed. 2003). 
 9. Leslie A. Balzer, Measuring Investment Risk: A Review, 3 J. INVESTING 47–48 (1994) 
(partially attributing recent attraction to the topic of investment risk to the increasing use of financial 
instruments with asymmetric payoffs). 
 10. See ARTHUR J. KEOWN ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE: THE LOGIC AND PRACTICE OF 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 242–43 (Leah Jewell ed., 1994). 
 11. Id. (recognizing a reduction in risk will occur if investments within a portfolio are not 
perfectly correlated). Cf. CHARLES E. BABIN, INVESTING SECRETS OF THE MASTERS 112 (2000) 
(suggesting the investment diversification mix should be constantly re-evaluated based on time frames, 
risk tolerances, income needs, and other factors). 
 Investment diversification can itself disperse risk in a way unrelated to this Article’s analysis. 
Investors who recognize their investments have become risky can sell the investments to other 
investors and reinvest the proceeds. But this merely changes the distribution of the risk without 
necessarily increasing aggregate risk to society. 
 12. Recall that a loan is simply an investment by a bank in its borrower. See supra note 4. 
 13. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1557–
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example, the bank may individually commit to lend only $2.5 million in a 
$10 million lending syndicate,
14
 or it may lend the full $10 million but 
then sell participations in 75 percent ($7.5 million) of its loan to other 
banks. In either case, the bank will end up having more diversified 
investments than a $10 million loan to a single borrower.
15
 
In recent years, computerized mathematical models have facilitated 
even more sophisticated techniques of dispersing risk in order to diversify 
investments. Consider, for example, securitization markets,
16
 in which risk 
is dispersed from owners of assets to investors in securities backed by 
those assets (so-called “asset-backed securities” or “ABS”) and to other 
market participants who may guarantee those securities.
17
 Within a given 
market, the asset-backed securities are divided not only into relatively 
small amounts but, more significantly, into multiple classes, or “tranches,” 
with different repayment priorities.
18
 Computers make it practical to track 
the underlying cash flows from the assets backing the securities and to 
allocate those cash flows to payment of the appropriate securities.
19
 This 
 
 
58 (2001). 
 14. This would occur, for example, if a syndicate of four banks commits to lend the borrower 
$10 million, each bank committing to 25 percent of that amount. In bank syndicates, different banks 
can commit to different lending percentages. See STANDARD & POOR’S, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN 
MARKET 7–12 (2010). 
 15. This assumes, of course, that the bank lends to other borrowers the $7.5 million not advanced 
(in the case of the loan syndication) or repaid (in the case of the sale of loan participations). 
 16. Another financial product commonly used for risk dispersing technique is the credit-default 
swap (“CDS”), a type of derivative in which one party (the credit seller) agrees, in exchange for the 
payment to it of a fee by a second party (the credit buyer), to assume the credit risk of certain debt 
obligations of a specified borrower or other obligor. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION § 10:1.1, at 10–5 (3d ed. 
supplemented through 2010). If a “credit event” (for example, default or bankruptcy) occurs in respect 
of that obligor, the credit seller will either: (a) pay the credit buyer an amount calculated by reference 
to post default value of the debt obligations or (b) buy the debt obligations (or other eligible debt 
obligations of the obligor) for their full face value from the credit buyer. Id. This Article focuses on 
risk dispersion through securitization. The general risk-dispersing principles should be the same for 
securitization and CDS; but because derivatives, including CDS, are sometimes used for speculation, 
the regulatory concerns go beyond those of merely dispersing risk. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic 
Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 219 (2008). 
 17. VINOD KOTHARI, SECURITIZATION: THE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT OF THE FUTURE 8–10 
(2006). Kothari describes securitization as a series of steps whereby financial assets of one or more 
originators are pooled and transferred into a separate legal vehicle. This vehicle is usually structured as 
independent from and protected against the bankruptcy risk of the originator. The vehicle issues 
securities that are repaid from collections on the pool of assets, not from the general funds of the 
originator. Sometimes a vehicle issues different classes of securities, usually differentially allocating 
risk and return to investors by allocating the order in which each class is repaid from collections. 
 18. Cf. Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, Structured Finance: Complexity, Risk and the Use of 
Ratings, BIS Q. REV. 67, 67–68 (2005) (describing the basics of tranching). 
 19. Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION 6 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 2000) (discussing computer 
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range of risk dispersion not only helps investors diversify their 
investments and thereby reduce risk
20
 but also, indirectly, maximizes the 
overall investor base. Because different investors have different risk 
profiles,
21
 offering securities with different repayment priorities will attract 
a broader range of investors.
22
 
Diversifying investments across markets. Risk dispersion is also used to 
diversify investments across markets. Investors traditionally diversified 
their investments across markets by investing in both debt and equity 
securities.
23
 But investments can also be diversified to some degree across 
“markets” by investing in debt securities with uncorrelated sources of 
payment. For example, ABS—in which risk is dispersed from owners of 
assets to investors in securities backed by those assets and to other market 
participants guaranteeing those securities
24—can be backed by virtually 
any type of predictable underlying payment source.
25
 To the extent 
different underlying payment sources are uncorrelated, the investment risk 
on securities backed by those different payment sources will also be 
uncorrelated.  
For example, the source of payment of an ordinary corporate bond is 
the income of the bond’s issuer. Most corporate issuers earn income by 
engaging in a business enterprise. Risk on corporate bonds is thus 
correlated with the industry sectors of their issuers.
26
 Business activity can 
also be influenced by the economic environment, further correlating risk 
on corporate bonds with the economy of the regions in which the issuer 
does business.
27
  
ABS, however, can include sources of payment that are largely 
uncorrelated with ordinary corporate bonds and that, potentially, are also 
 
 
technology created to track cash flows). 
 20. HUBBARD, supra note 7, at 336 (observing that “securitization helps lenders to diversify and 
share risk”). 
 21. See supra note 6. 
 22. Steven Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 143 
(1994). 
 23. See WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, THE FOUR PILLARS OF INVESTING: LESSONS FOR BUILDING A 
WINNING PORTFOLIO 126 (2002) (suggesting the most important investment decision is how to 
allocate money between debt and equity). 
 24. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 25. COX ET AL., supra note 4, at 80. 
 26. Cf. Edwin J. Elton et al., Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds, 56 J. FIN. 247, 
247–48 (2001) (explaining the differences in the rates offered on corporate bonds and government 
bonds). 
 27. Cf. Dimitrios Kavvathas, Estimating Credit Rating Transition Probabilities for Corporate 
Bonds, AFA 2001 NEW ORLEANS MEETINGS 1, 9 n.13 (2000) (observing the connection between 
credit markets and the macroeconomic environment). 
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largely uncorrelated with other types of ABS. For example, risk on 
securities backed by a statistically diverse pool of consumer credit-card 
receivables should have little correlation with risk on bonds issued by a 
ship-building company. Similarly, risk on securities backed by consumer 
credit-card receivables should have little correlation with risk on securities 
backed by commercial mortgage loans.  
Part of the “art” of investment diversification, however, is determining 
the practical degree of correlations. It will never be zero. As the financial 
crisis has shown, some degree of correlation will always exist in a global 
economy.
28
 Although investment diversification is a primary reason for 
dispersing risk, there are other reasons as well. For example, asymmetry in 
market information can be reduced—and risk more efficiently allocated—
by shifting risk on financial assets to investors and other market 
participants (such as third-party credit enhancers) who are better able to 
assess the risk.
29
 Risk dispersion, therefore, can create benefits. However, 
the following discussion shows how risk dispersion can create market 
failures that, among other harms, cause market participants to misjudge or 
ignore potential correlations.  
B. Market Failures 
Risk dispersion causes market participants to pay less attention to the 
retained risk. This is reasonable to the extent the lower level of attention is 
proportionate to the lower level of risk. But risk dispersion can also lead to 
market failures, causing market participants to underestimate and under-
protect against risk.
30
 For example, prior to the financial crisis investors 
believed that ABS provided an investment market that was uncorrelated 
with traditional debt markets
31
 and that, even within the ABS market, 
 
 
 28. In an economic downturn, for example, some consumers may be unable to pay their credit-
card debts, some corporate lessees may be unable to pay their mortgages, and, if less goods are being 
shipped, ship-building companies may have less business.  
 29. STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 16, §§ 2:3–2:4; KOTHARI, supra note 17, at 220 
(examining risk allocation where a “monoline insurance company would provide insurance cover to 
some of the securities in a securitization transaction, which, based on the rating of the insurance 
company itself, would substantially upgrade the rating of the said securities”). 
 30. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 390–91 (2008) (asking whether structured finance dispersed 
subprime mortgage risk so widely that no investor had a clear incentive to monitor it); George A. 
Walker, Financial Crisis—U.K. Policy and Regulatory Response, 44 INT’L LAWYER 751, 758 (2010) 
(“[T]he securitized credit market . . . was intended to diversify and reduce risk rather than aggravate 
it.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Anand K. Bhattacharya and Frank J. Fabozzi, The Expanding Frontiers of Asset 
Securitization, in INVESTING IN ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 2–3 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2000) 
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many investments were diversified.
32
 But when ABS investments backed 
by subprime mortgage loans began defaulting, other ABS investments 
backed by other types of assets began defaulting as well.
33
 Few had seen 
the correlation between the subprime mortgage loans and those other 
assets.
34
 The marginalization of risk caused by risk dispersion appears to 
have made investors and other market participants insufficiently diligent to 
recognize or worry about this correlation.
35
  
Moreover, when the ABS market collapsed, its collapse impacted other 
debt markets. Although the ABS market had been seen as uncorrelated 
with ordinary debt markets (like bonds and commercial paper),
36
 there was 
a correlation: most debt securities—even ABS—are rated by rating 
agencies.
37
 When investors lost faith in the ratings of ABS, their loss of 
faith extended to the ratings of all debt securities.
38
 Again, the 
marginalization of risk caused by risk dispersion appears to have made 
investors and other market participants insufficiently diligent to recognize, 
or at least to appreciate the significance of, this second correlation.
39
 
Consequences of Marginalization. Marginalization of risk can have 
two orders of consequences. First-order consequences would be harm only 
to the market participants that underestimate and under-protect against the 
 
 
(discussing why ABS then represented a very small fraction of most fixed-income (i.e., debt securities) 
indices); Investing in the CDO Market, CRYSTALFUND.COM, http://www.crystalfund.com/cdo.shtml 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2012); see also ANAND K. BHATTACHARYA & FRANK J. FABOZZI, ASSET BACKED 
SECURITIES 11–13 (1996). 
 32. Cf. Tarun Sabarwal, Common Structures of Asset-Backed Securities and Their Risks, 4 CORP. 
OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 258, 258 (2006) (observing that asset-backed securities “increase investment 
opportunities for different classes of investors, because receivables from a given pool of collateral can 
be structured so that securities based on this pool have very different risk and return profiles”). 
 33. Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 552 
(2009).  
 34. Id. (observing the correlation that once investors lost faith in mortgage-backed securities, 
they lost confidence in ratings of debt securities generally).  
 35. Id. at 553 (discussing the mutual misinformation problem). 
 36. ANAND K. BHATTACHARYA ET AL., ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 12 (1996) (contrasting the 
ABS market with the corporate bond market and noting, among other non-correlating factors, that “the 
credit enhancement in the ABS market is provided by a variety of sources”). 
 37. See Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the 
Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 237 (2009) (noting that “modern 
credit rating agencies are private, for-profit companies that assess the creditworthiness of the issuers of 
debt and debt-like securities,” such as asset-backed securities). 
 38. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 33, at 552. 
 39. Marginalization of risk does not explain, however, why credit enhancers such as monoline 
insurance companies, which often insured large loss positions of multiple investors, were sometimes 
themselves insufficiently diligent. Cf. supra note 29 (referencing monoline insurance companies). As 
observed supra note 2, there are various explanations of the financial crisis. Risk marginalization is 
merely one.  
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risk.
40
 Second-order consequences would be harm that extends beyond 
(although it may include) those parties—such as harm resulting from a 
financial crisis or systemic collapse that is caused in whole or in part by a 
market participant under-protecting against the risk. Thus, first-order 
consequences would arise if a firm under-protects against a risk that 
causes the firm to lose $1 million but causes no harm to others. Second-
order consequences would arise if a firm under-protects against a risk that 
contributes to causing a systemic financial collapse. 
The failure of Enron
41
 represents an example of first-order 
consequences. Under-protection against risk caused that failure,
42
 but it did 
not have a systemic impact on the financial system.
43
 The financial crisis, 
in contrast, exemplifies under-protection against risk that did lead to 
second-order consequences.
44
 
II. ANALYSIS 
Why does risk dispersion sometimes marginalize risk, causing market 
participants to underestimate and under-protect against the risk? The 
reasons can be different for first-order consequences and second-order 
consequences. 
A. First-Order Consequences 
For first-order consequences, risk dispersion can cause market 
participants to underestimate and under-protect against risk for at least 
three interrelated
45
 reasons. 
 
 
 40. Harm to a market participant includes any harm to the market participant’s direct investors. 
If, for example, XYZ Corporation is an investor, harm to XYZ may also harm XYZ’s shareholders. 
These harms would all be first-order consequences. 
 41. For a discussion of Enron’s failure, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of 
Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1310–11 (2002).  
 42. Id. (examining Enron’s failure).  
 43. This appears to be because Enron’s failure “did not closely correlate with the viability of 
other financial institutions.” Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: 
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1359 (2011). But cf. Alan 
Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 2003 
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030508/default.htm (arguing that the widespread use of 
credit-default swaps mitigated the potentially devastating repercussions of the “largest corporate 
defaults in history [WorldCom and Enron]”). This Article does not regard a firm’s investors as third 
parties; hence, the fact that Enron’s shareholders were harmed by Enron’s failure does not create 
second-order consequences.  
 44. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.  
 45. The information, model, and human processing failures discussed below are interrelated. For 
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1. Information Failure  
Risk dispersion can cause information failure, of which there are at 
least two forms: disclosure failure and observational failure.  
Disclosure failure. As finance becomes more complex, disclosure can 
become inadequate.
46
 Risk dispersion exacerbates this problem by further 
complicating financial complexity. For example, “[b]y increasing 
exponentially the number of underlying assets—using assets which 
themselves are complex financial instruments, and using more complex 
structures—a CDO investor faces a far greater information burden than an 
investor in” simple mortgage-backed securities.47  
Disclosure can become inadequate in the face of complexity for several 
reasons. Even if technically accurate and complete, disclosure can be 
virtually incomprehensible—or at least not worth any given investor’s 
time to comprehend.
48
 Even some institutional investors may lack the 
staffing to evaluate complex securitization transactions.
49
 Institutional 
investors will not always hire securitization experts as needed to decipher 
complex deals because “at some level of complexity,” the costs of hiring 
those experts will exceed, “or at least appear to exceed, any potential 
gain.
50
 This is because the cost of hiring experts is tangible, whereas the 
benefit gained from fully understanding complex transactions is intangible 
and harder to quantify.”51 Thus, even large and sophisticated hedge funds 
have failed, notwithstanding “full” disclosure, to understand the risks 
 
 
example, model failure is a specific form of information failure, and human processing failure in part 
explains why people rely on imperfect information and models, and the result of such reliance. 
Nonetheless, breaking these failures into these three categories has explanatory utility. 
 46. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 
238–45 (2009); see also infra notes 48–53 and accompanying text (explaining why disclosure can 
become inadequate in the face of complexity). 
 47. Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity and 
Systemic Risk (Dec. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Schwarcz, 
Systemic Risk, supra note 16, at 221 (observing that risk diversification increases the chance that some 
market participants may not fully understand the risks they are taking on); Cf. Sabarwal, supra note 32, 
at 258–59 (explaining how, by varying the distribution of proceeds from the same pool of collateral, 
asset-backed securities with “very different risk and return profiles” can be created).  
 48. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 46, at 238–45; Cf. Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH. L. REV. 1109, 1113–
15 (discussing when an investor’s failure to fully understand an investment may represent rational 
ignorance); Joel Telpner, A Securitisation Primer For First Time Issuers, in GLOBAL SECURITISATION 
AND STRUCTURED FINANCE 2003 1, 6 (2003) (discussing complexity of disclosing the risk that 
subordinated investors may not receive payments under the waterfall of payments in transactions that 
have multiple tranches of securities with different repayment priorities).  
 49. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, supra note 48, at 1114. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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inherent in highly complex ABS CDO transactions.
52
 Furthermore, 
“agency costs stemming from a conflict between the interests of individual 
employees and the institutions for which they work” may motivate 
individual employees to sometimes take shortcuts when evaluating 
complex investments, such as by “over-relying on” the “securities being 
rated ‘investment grade’... and not spending the time and effort needed to 
fully understand the hundreds of pages of disclosure for each 
investment.”53 
Observational failure. After dispersing risk, a market participant may 
be privy to less information, or may be less concerned, about the 
consequences of various financial-market events that feed back into the 
participant’s exposure.54 To that extent, risk dispersion anomalously 
decreases the exposure to some risks (the dispersed risk) but exposes the 
market participant to other risks (less information).
55
 Information failure, 
whether from inadequate disclosure or decreased market feedback, can 
marginalize risk.
56
 For example, market participants may have insufficient 
information to predict how (or when) correlations could transform 
otherwise insignificant risks into major risks. This Article has already 
given examples of correlation failures caused by risk dispersion.
57
 
 
 
 52. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of 
Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis (U.C. Berkeley Public Law Res. Paper, Working 
Paper No. 1585953, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585953. 
For an explanation of ABS CDO transactions, see infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 53. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, supra note 48, at 1114–15. 
 54. E-mail from Oren Sussman, Reader in Finance, Said Business School, University of Oxford, 
to author (Oct. 5, 2010 (10:11 PM)) (on file with author). 
 55. Id. The point at which the trade-off between these two risks becomes suboptimal is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 56. It is also possible, of course, that information failure might sometimes motivate market 
participants to over-protect against unknown consequences. 
 57. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (discussing failure to see the correlation 
between subprime mortgage loans and other assets); supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text 
(discussing failure to see the correlation between all debt securities and ratings). Another example is 
the failure of investors to recognize an underlying correlation between mobile-home loans and the 
price of oil during the late 1970s and early 1980s. An oil boom in Oklahoma drew an influx of oil 
workers, creating the nation’s fastest growing market for mobile-home loans. When oil prices crashed, 
drilling in Oklahoma ceased, resulting in massive unemployment and widespread defaults on the 
mobile-home loans. Paul Bennett, Effective Monetary Policy in the U.S. and Emerging Markets 5–8 
(Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Enron’s collapse illustrates another 
correlation failure. Enron’s primary and most profitable business strategy was acting as a derivatives 
counterparty. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate 
Structures, supra note 41, at 1309. Because only investment-grade firms are generally accepted as 
counterparties, it was critical to Enron to preserve its investment-grade rating—the main risk to this 
rating being the possibility that Enron’s merchant assets might drop in value, requiring Enron to mark 
down to market those asset values. Id. at 1309–10 & 1309 n.2. Enron sought to protect its rating by 
engaging in a series of structured transactions that effectively used Enron stock—which had a 
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Correlations may only be observable when there is full appreciation of the 
underlying variables.
58
 
2. Model Failure 
As previously discussed, computerized mathematical models have 
facilitated more sophisticated techniques of dispersing risk in order to 
diversify investments.
59
 But this can increase the complexity of the 
investments themselves, often requiring business managers to rely on the 
output of mathematical models to understand the risk. To the extent these 
models rely on untested assumptions and simplifications, they can be 
misleading.  
Consider, for example, VaR, or value-at-risk. With limited time 
available to devote to risk assessment, a firm’s senior managers often want 
risk to be modeled and reduced to useable numbers.
60
 VaR was the most 
widely used model for reducing investment risk to a number.
61
 As the VaR 
model became more accepted, firms began compensating analysts not only 
for generating profits but also for generating profits with low risks, 
measured by VaR.
62
 Analysts, therefore, began to refocus investment 
portfolios to concentrate more on securities (such as mortgage-backed 
securities and credit-default swaps) that generate high gains and only 
rarely have losses.
63
 Because the likelihood of these losses was less than 
the risk percentages taken into account under VaR modeling—which 
typically excludes losses that have less than a one-percent (or, in some 
cases, five-percent) likelihood of occurring within the model’s limited 
time frame—such losses were not included in the VaR computations.64 
 
 
historically rising public-market price—as collateral to hedge the value of its merchant assets. In 
return, Enron made guarantees tied to the stock price. Id. Enron “judged the risk that it would have to 
pay on its guarantees as remote,” but Enron’s stock price subsequently fell to unanticipated levels—
triggering the Enron guarantees and causing Enron to lose its investment-grade rating. Id. at 1310–11, 
1315. Deprived of its primary business strategy, Enron had little choice but to file for bankruptcy. Id. 
 58. The limitations of cognitive complexity may also help to explain the inability of even 
financial analysts and other “experts” to see correlations. Different people perceive the same 
phenomena on different levels of complexity. As the complexity of financial products increased, fewer 
analysts possessed sufficiently nuanced cognition to properly understand and price the products. 
Trying to do their jobs, many analysts made oversimplifications—usually on the optimistic side 
because the economy was expanding. To some extent, these simplifications involved overreliance on 
heuristics. See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 46, at 222–23. 
 59. See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text. 
 60. Nocera, supra note 2, at 26. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 46. 
 63. Id. Mortgage-backed securities are a subset of ABS. 
 64. Id. 
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Analysts knew, but did not always communicate, that VaR could cause 
senior managers to underestimate risk: in the rare cases where losses 
occurred, they could be huge.
65
 
So-called “ABS CDO” securities—essentially securitizations of asset-
backed securities already issued in prior securitization transactions
66—
illustrate another way that computerized mathematical models have failed, 
through their very complexity, in the attempt to disperse risk. These 
securities did not have an active trading market, so models were used to 
substitute for real market information.
67
 Investors therefore relied on 
mark-to-model valuation of these securities.
68
 “When assumptions 
underlying the models turned out to be wrong, investors panicked because 
they did not know what the securities were worth.”69 
3. Human Processing Failure  
Behavioral psychology helps to explain why dispersed risk can be 
marginalized.
70
 On a basic level, the human brain’s ability to accurately 
correlate perceived and actual risk is limited.
71
 Even worse, human 
thought processing is not merely inaccurate but subject to discontinuities 
and misdirection. An example of a discontinuity is the predilection to 
ignore or undervalue risk below a minimum threshold level.
72
 Examples of 
misdirection include the tendency to see what one wants to see if risks are 
unclear,
73
 to assume that the future will resemble the recent past,
74
 and to 
value immediate certain gains over contingent long-term losses.
75
 
 
 
 65. Id.; Cf. Carlo Acerbi et al., Expected Shortfall as a Tool for Financial Risk Management, 
ARXIV (Feb. 16, 2001), http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/cond-mat/pdf/0102/0102304v1.pdf 1, 3 (noting that 
“VaR always come[s] late when the damage is already done” is a well-known adage reflecting that 
future market probabilities are commonly estimated from past market data). 
 66. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 46, at 220. 
 67. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1324 (2009).  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. This discussion of human thought processing failure can be viewed as a subset of the more 
general problem of ‘complacency,’ which I have identified as one of the causes of the financial crisis. 
See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 30, at 404–05. 
 71. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts About 
Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 315 (2004) (finding that humans are 
inherent risk takers and do not shy away from situations they recognize are risky). 
 72. Cf. Richard J. Herring et al., Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr. and Oliver Wyman Inst. 12th Annual 
Fin. Risk Roundtable 2009: The New Role of Risk Management: Rebuilding the Model (June 24, 
2009), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2268. 
 73. It is reported, for example, that King Croesus of Lydia wanted to make war on Cyrus, but 
was wary of doing so without heavenly sanction. After singling out the Delphic Oracle as the most 
reliable, the king’s messengers “asked the practical question about the advisability of Croesus’ going 
to war, and received the famous [and famously ambiguous] response that ‘Croesus by crossing the 
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By increasing complexity,
76
 risk dispersion makes these human thought 
processing failures worse. For example, fewer people will have 
sufficiently nuanced cognition to fully understand the complexity, and 
those without that cognitional ability may overrely on simplifying 
heuristics.
77
 That overreliance may be worsened by the human tendency to 
ignore details when overwhelmed by complexity.
78
  
Even hiring experts may not always provide perfect information. 
Indeed, it sometimes can generate misleading information. Experts do not 
always see the big picture. Consider medical specialists with intensive 
training in a particular organ, disease, or part of the body. Once they leave 
medical school, they concentrate on their specialty, focusing on the organ 
or disease rather than on the whole body.
79
 A general practitioner, in 
contrast, is more likely to detect other illnesses, which can prevent further 
harm for the patient.
80
  
 
 
Halys would destroy a mighty kingdom.’” THOMAS DEMPSEY, THE DELPHIC ORACLE: ITS EARLY 
HISTORY, INFLUENCE, AND FALL 70 (1918). Croesus interpreted this to mean what he wanted to 
hear—that Cyrus would fall—but in fact the empire that fell was his own. Id. at 71; see also id. at 71, 
107 (discussing the historical method of the oracles as “shelter[ing] his ignorance behind a studied 
ambiguity” and vagueness). This same method of response is said also to be used today by fortune 
tellers. See J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., Alternative Keynesian and Post Keynesian Perspectives on 
Uncertainty and Expectations, 23 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 545, 554–57 (2001) (arguing that 
uncertainty leads to self-fulfilling mistakes). 
 74. Under the availability heuristic, for example, we overestimate the frequency or likelihood of 
an event when examples of, or associations with, similar events are easily brought to mind. Thus, 
people typically overestimate the divorce rate if they can quickly find examples of divorced friends. 
Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived 
Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465 (Daniel Kahneman et al. 
eds., 1982). 
 75. Cf. Cullen Roche, Risk Management: An Undervalued Commodity on Wall Street, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Jan. 14, 2011, 5:35 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/risk-management-an-undervalued-
commodity-on-wall-street-2011-1. Market participants might also be misled by the incongruity that 
although risk dispersion can reduce investment risk from an individual participant’s standpoint, it does 
not necessarily reduce overall risk; in other words, risk may be widely distributed among participants 
in a given market, but the aggregate amount of risk may still be present. Id. 
 76. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (explaining why risk dispersion increases 
complexity). 
 77. See supra note 58. Investors may also tend to ignore “details” when overwhelmed by 
complexity, leading to overreliance on heuristics. See, e.g., Paul Monk, Austhink, Plenary Address to 
the 2004 Fenner Conference on the Environment (May 24, 2004), available at http://www.science.org 
.au/events/fenner/fenner2004/monk.html (explaining how individuals are prone to be swayed by only 
salient points and forgetful of details, due to the combined effects of limited working memory 
capacity, confirmation bias, and belief preservation). Query whether that tendency might be a 
metaphor for the financial future. 
 78. WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT ET AL., LANGUAGE AND MEANING IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE: 
COGNITIVE ISSUES AND SEMANTIC THEORY 85 (Josefa Toribio & Andy Clark eds., 1998). 
 79. I. R. McWhinney, Decision Making in General Practice, 10 J. ROYAL C. GEN. PRAC. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 31, 32 (1980). 
 80. Id. 
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Explanations of the myopia of experts focus on accuracy of recall and 
inflexibility.
81
 Although “[e]xperts may outperform novices in recalling 
the details of a problem or text,”82 they “tend to underperform novices” 
when their domain knowledge cannot be specifically utilized.
83
 Indeed, 
experts with large amounts of specialized knowledge are effectively 
confined by their knowledge, which “is efficient if the solution happens to 
fall [within that knowledge] but which can backfire if it does not.”84 A 
failure to see the big picture is especially likely when risk dispersion 
causes some financial products to become so complex that few financial 
“experts” have the specialized knowledge to understand them in their 
entirety.
85
 
B. Second-Order Consequences 
For second-order consequences, risk dispersion can marginalize risk 
due to the same market failures discussed previously and also because of 
another type of market failure—collective action problems, as discussed 
below. First, consider the previously discussed market failures. 
1. Information, Model, and Human Processing Failures 
Risk dispersion can cause market participants to underestimate and 
under-protect against risk, leading to second-order consequences due to 
the information, model, and human thought processing failures. For 
example, the seeds of the financial crisis were planted when mortgage 
lenders began making loans to risky borrowers secured by the homes that 
the borrowers purchased with the loan proceeds. Mortgage lenders then 
dispersed risk on these “subprime mortgage loans” by bundling them 
together as collateral to partially support the payment of complex asset-
backed securities that were sold to banks and other institutional 
investors.
86
 These securities maintained their value so long as home prices 
 
 
 81. See Ahmad Hashem et al., Medical Errors as a Result of Specialization, 36 J. BIOMEDICAL 
INFORMATICS 61, 61–62 (2003). 
 82. Id. at 61. 
 83. Id. (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. at 62. 
 85. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 13–4 (2004) (comparing complex financial transactions to airplanes about which few 
understand the entirety); Cf. WALL STREET: MONEY NEVER SLEEPS (20th Century Fox 2010) (in 
which Gordon Gekko, the fictional banker, observed that “there are probably only seventy-five people 
in the world who actually understand the new breed of complex financial instruments.”). 
 86. See Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 33, at 550–51. 
Although lenders made these subprime loans to risky borrowers, the basic business model was not 
  
 
 
 
 
502 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:487 
 
 
 
 
appreciated, as they had been doing for decades and as market observers 
assumed would continue.
87
 That assumption, in retrospect, was a multiple 
human thought processing failure—ignoring a small risk, under-estimating 
a low-probability risk, seeing what one wants to see when risks are 
unclear, assuming that the future (of housing prices) will resemble the 
recent past, and valuing immediate certain gains (such as fees) over 
contingent long-term losses.
88
  
When home prices began falling, some of these asset-backed securities 
began defaulting,
89
 requiring financial institutions heavily invested in 
these securities to write down their value, causing these institutions to 
appear, and possibly to become, financially risky.
90
 The fact that financial 
institutions became heavily invested in dubious securities resulted at least 
in part from model failure: a reliance on mathematical models with 
untested assumptions or simplifications, like VaR, to assess risk.
91
 
The apparent riskiness of financial institutions heavily invested in these 
securities should have had only first-order consequences, to the firms 
themselves. It took on second-order consequences, however, because of an 
information failure—to appreciate the significance of the correlation 
among financial firms and markets
92
 and to know with certainty the actual 
riskiness of any given firm. As firms perceived the riskiness of other firms 
(“counterparty risk”) increasing, they stopped dealing with each other, 
thereby reducing the availability of credit.
93
 Similarly, as securities backed 
by subprime loans began defaulting, investors stopped investing—not only 
in those securities but also in securities backed by other types of collateral 
and in debt securities more generally.
94
 Because debt markets had been 
 
 
irrational and had some successful precedent. See id. at 550. 
 87. See Jack Guttentag, Shortsighted About the Subprime Disaster, WASH. POST, May 26, 2007, 
at F2 (explaining that because housing prices had been rising for a long period of time, it was assumed 
that they would continue to rise). 
 88. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing these human thought processing failures). 
 89. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 33, at 550–51 
(explaining that home appreciation had been expected to enable risky borrowers to refinance to lower 
interest rates). 
 90. Id. at 553. 
 91. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text (discussing VaR). 
 92. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing correlation failure as a subset of information failure). 
 93. Market participants are bound to become concerned about counterparty risk in the aftermath 
of an economic shock, such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers, because all parties are only aware of 
their own contractual obligations. Concern over perceived counterparty risk becomes self-fulfilling 
since firms become reluctant to deal with each other. This creates additional funding needs; for 
example, by increasing the price of credit default swaps. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering 
the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 97–98 (2009). 
 94. See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 30, at 395. The original defaults on 
securities backed by subprime loans implicated only highly leveraged ABS CDO securities; but those 
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supplanting banks as sources of credit, reduced investment in those 
markets further reduced the availability of credit.
95
 The resulting lack of 
credit impacted the real economy.
96
  
Risk dispersion therefore led to the types of market failures discussed 
in Part II.A, which contributed to the financial crisis.
97
 But risk dispersion 
can also lead to collective-action market failures that more directly cause 
second-order consequences.  
2. Collective Action Failures  
There are at least two types of collective action market failures. The 
first is a form of tragedy of the commons (hereinafter, “TOC failure”), “in 
which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to 
individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize 
use of the resource, whereas the costs of exploitation” are distributed more 
widely.
98
 This failure arises because individual market participants are 
self-regarding when making risk-taking decisions, whereas those decisions 
can have spillover effects (externalities) due to the interconnectivity 
among financial firms and markets.
99
 Absent regulatory intervention, 
market participants will progressively pursue their self-interest to the 
detriment of other market participants, the financial system, and the real 
economy.
100
 It is rational for individual market participants to under-
protect against second-order consequences.
101
  
 
 
defaults triggered a lack of confidence in the broader asset-backed securities markets and in rating-
agency ratings, which in turn triggered a lack of investor confidence in the broader markets for debt 
securities. See Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 33, at 552; see 
also Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 46, at 223 (observing that 
“although [these] ABS CDO securities were backed by what appeared to be significantly diverse 
assets, there was an underlying correlation in the subprime mortgage loans backing many of those 
securities”). 
 95. This ongoing shift of the source of corporate financing from banks to financial and capital 
markets is referred to as disintermediation. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 16, at 200. 
Around the time of the financial crisis, “conventional commercial bank lending had dropped to [only] 
30 percent” of corporate financing. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, No Time to Lose, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Mar. 2009, at 80. 
 96. See Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 33, at 571. 
 97. See supra Part II.A.  
 98. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 16, at 206 (observing this failure). This is a form of 
tragedy of the commons, though not a classic tragedy of the commons in which the parties involved 
commonly suffer the externality they cause. See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (using example of an overgrazed pasture resulting from common 
ownership, where no individual owner has the right to exclude use by other owners). 
 99. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 43, at 1375. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Individual market participants may well, on an expected-value basis, be better off (e.g., by 
  
 
 
 
 
504 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:487 
 
 
 
 
Although the potential for TOC failure exists regardless of risk 
dispersion,
102
 risk dispersion can greatly exacerbate that failure. For 
example, a tragedy of the commons will “play out as long as the decision-
making structures regarding resource management are based solely on 
individuals making decisions for their own gain,”103 and risk dispersion 
increases individual investment decisions. More significantly, risk 
dispersion can mislead investors into thinking that they no longer need to 
worry about the dispersed risk. In the financial crisis, for example, few 
market participants appear to have thought about where dispersed risk 
went, or whether dispersed risk could impact the stability of financial 
markets.  
The second type of collective action failure is unique to risk dispersion: 
risk can be so widely dispersed that a rational market participant 
individually lacks the incentive to monitor it (hereinafter, “incentive 
failure”).104 For example, an investor contemplating purchasing a 
relatively small tranche of high-yield subordinated securities may find that 
the cost of performing due diligence and ongoing monitoring would wipe 
out any interest-rate advantage of the securities.
105
 The investor may 
nonetheless be motivated to make the investment, notwithstanding lack of 
due diligence and monitoring, if its competitors are investing in similarly 
risky but high-yield securities and the investor needs to invest in those 
securities to remain competitive (at least in the short term).
106
  
 
 
receiving fees) engaging in risk-dispersing transactions because most of any potential harmful 
externalities would be imposed on third parties (e.g., “Main Street”). 
 102. Cf. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 16, at 206.  
 103. Alok Gupta et al., Streamlining the Digital Economy: How to Avert a Tragedy of the 
Commons, 1 IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 38, 39 (1997); Accord DAVID NICKERSON & RONNIE J. 
PHILLIPS ET AL., TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 117–18 
(Benton E. Gup ed., 2004). 
 104. See supra note 30. Incentive failure and TOC failure have different natures and even 
consequences. For example, any harm from TOC failure is likely to consist of externalities in the form 
of systemic effects, although that harm may indirectly impact the market participant; whereas any 
harm from incentive failure is likely to impact the market participant itself, although that harm may 
indirectly cause externalities in the form of systemic effects. 
 105. Although a single small investment would not cause significant externalities, an investor may 
engage in numerous such transactions or numerous investors may engage in similar transactions. 
 106. If, for example, the investor invests in safer, and therefore lower-yielding, securities, its (at 
least short term) profitability will be lower than that of its competitors. That can cause the investor’s 
shareholders to shift their money to more profitable investors. Cf. Michiyo Nakamoto & David 
Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-out, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 2007, http://www.ft.com/ 
cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-0000779fd2ac.html (quoting Chuck Prince, former chairman and 
CEO of Citigroup, as stating that “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be 
complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still 
dancing.”). 
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The investor may then be under-protecting against risk. The investor 
may assume, for example, that other investors have more significant 
amounts at stake and therefore must be engaging in due diligence and 
monitoring, and the investor therefore can be a free rider (although this 
assumption may not always be true). The investor also may be 
rationalizing that it will be in no worse position than its competitors, who 
are making these same kinds of investments, if the investment fails
107—
especially given the investment’s relatively small size. Even if that 
rationalization is justified at the outset, however, continuing competitive 
pressures may motivate the investor to increase the investment, especially 
where approval of the initial investment sets an institutional precedent that 
makes further approvals easier.  
The behavioral psychology factors discussed earlier also help to 
explain why a market participant, under pressure to remain competitive, 
would rely on untested assumptions or would engage in rationalizations 
when making what might later turn out to be bad investments.
108
 The 
market participant may ignore or undervalue bad-investment risk, for 
example, if that risk appears to be small. Likewise, the investor will see 
what it wants to see, given the competitive pressures, if the bad-investment 
risk is unclear, or it will value the immediate certain gain of maintaining 
its competitive position over the contingency that the investment will 
cause a long-term loss.
109
 Risk dispersion can also potentiate “herd 
behavior” by masking its consequences.110  
 
 
 107. A market participant may rationalize in this way even without believing that other market 
participants have better information on which it may free ride. See, e.g., GORDON DE BROUWER, 
HEDGE FUNDS IN EMERGING MARKETS 150 (2001) (noting that “even rational market participants may 
at times ignore their own private information and follow the actions of earlier participants because the 
[perceived] information in other people’s collective actions overwhelms the individual’s private 
information.”). 
 108. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 109. Cf. supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing short-term investor focus). 
 110. Herd behavior involves following the lead of a critical mass of other market participants. See, 
e.g., H. KENT BAKER & JOHN R. NOFSINGER, BEHAVIORAL FINANCE: INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, 
AND MARKETS 204–05 (2010) (noting the propensity to make investment decisions based on herding, 
and suggesting that “[a] rational explanation for such behavior hinges upon the assumption that in a 
world of imperfect and asymmetric information, individuals follow the market trend as a fast and 
frugal heuristic,” rationalizing that “the crowd or market might be better informed than a single 
individual”). 
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 III. SOLUTIONS 
A. Should Government Attempt to Regulate the Problem? 
Risk dispersion can create market failures, and a traditional role of 
government is to help correct market failures.
111
 In principle, therefore, 
government regulation should be appropriate, but that begs the practical 
question of whether the problem of risk dispersion is sufficiently harmful 
to merit regulation. In answering this question, one should start by 
distinguishing first- and second-order consequences. Regulating risk 
dispersion that causes only first-order consequences would likely be 
inefficient. Market participants themselves should want to protect against 
first-order consequences. This does not mean that all firms will protect 
perfectly against such consequences, but it is unlikely that paternalistic 
government regulation would do a better job.
112
 
In contrast, it may well be appropriate to regulate risk dispersion that 
causes second-order consequences. Second-order consequences are 
externalities, and traditionally government regulations attempt to require 
parties to internalize the externalities they cause.
113
 The discussion below 
therefore focuses on designing regulation of risk dispersion that causes 
second-order consequences. Any such regulation will diminish first-order 
consequences as well because the market failures that cause risk dispersion 
leading to second-order consequences can also create first-order 
consequences.
114
  
B. Designing Regulation 
Regulation should be designed to correct market failures.
115
 Thus, 
regulation protecting against risk dispersion that causes second-order 
consequences should be designed either to correct the underlying market 
failures caused by the risk dispersion or to limit the risk dispersion ab 
initio. First consider correcting the underlying market failures.  
 
 
 111. Hans-Werner Sinn, The Selection Principle and Market Failure in Systems Competition, 66 J. 
PUB. ECON. 247, 248 (1997) (recognizing that governments usually try to correct market failures). 
 112. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Markets, Market Failures, and Development, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 197, 202 
(1989) (recognizing that governments may not want to enter a place where the private market has 
failed, and that government may not do a better job than the private market does in correcting failures). 
 113. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23 (1982); see also Vincent Ostrom et al., 
The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
831, 832 (1961) (observing that a basic goal of government is to internalize externalities). 
 114. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.  
 115. See, e.g., IVAN PNG & DALE LEHMAN, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 414 (3d ed. 2007). 
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1. Regulating the Information, Model, and Human Processing 
Failures 
Recall that risk dispersion can cause information, model, and human 
thought processing failures that not only cause first-order consequences 
but also can result in second-order consequences. As discussed, market 
participants should want to self-regulate to prevent first-order 
consequences; but self-regulation will be insufficient to prevent second-
order consequences, which are externalities.
116
 To the extent the 
information, model, and human thought processing failures are not 
corrected through self-regulation, the discussion next examines, albeit 
briefly, how regulation could be designed to help correct them.
117
  
Information failure. In the related context of complexity, I have 
examined whether disclosure itself can be improved in the face of 
complexity.
118
 I considered a range of possible responses to disclosure’s 
limitations, including guaranties and governmental and private-sector 
certifications of quality.
119
 These responses, especially private-sector 
certification of quality, can help to some degree.
120
 For example, aligning 
the compensation of employees with the long-term interests of their firms 
can help to mitigate information failure that results from agency 
conflicts.
121
 These solutions, however, will not fully solve the information 
failure problem.
122
 That problem results not only from information 
asymmetry but, sometimes more insidiously, can be exacerbated when 
parties with apparently greater information mistakenly certify quality, 
thereby (inadvertently) misleading investors and other parties.
123
 
Model failure. I have also separately examined how to mitigate model 
failure in the face of complexity. The most effective approach would be to 
 
 
 116. Supra Part II.B.  
 117. That discussion is not this Article’s primary focus because, in a related context, I have 
separately addressed regulation of these types of failures. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 43, at 
1382–93. 
 118. See generally Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 46; see 
also Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, supra note 48. 
 119. See Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, supra note 48, at 
1119–21.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Compare supra note 53 and accompanying text (explaining how agency costs stemming from 
a conflict between the interests of individual employees and the institutions for which they work may 
motivate individual employees to sometimes take shortcuts) with infra notes 124–25 and 
accompanying text (discussing how to mitigate agency costs by aligning compensation with long-term 
interests of the firm). 
 122. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, supra note 48, at 1119–21. 
 123. Id. at 1121 (referring to this as a mutual misinformation problem). 
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align the compensation of employees working with or relying on models 
with the long-term interests of their firms.
124
 That would motivate 
employees to better reveal the risks and limitations of models to their 
senior management.
125
 
Firms have incentives and are in a better position than government 
regulators to determine how best to align their long-term interests with 
employee compensation. Alignment is difficult to achieve, however, 
because individual firms that attempt to align incentives will be 
disadvantaged in their ability to compete for the best employees.
126
 
Regulation “may well be needed to help resolve this collective-action 
problem.”127 Because firms are increasingly global and top employees can 
move among nations, any such regulation should ideally be international 
in order to avoid prejudicing nations that individually require employee 
compensation to be aligned with long-term firm interests.
128
  
Another way to mitigate model failure in the face of complexity would 
be to develop more reliable models. Although VaR has been the most 
common model used by market participants for assessing risk,
129
 its 
limitations were not always communicated to senior managers.
130
 The 
alignment of incentives, discussed above, would help to increase that 
communication, but efforts should also be made to improve the VaR 
model to make it more accurate. Economists Tobias Adrian and Markus 
Brunnermeier, for example, are attempting to reduce what they see as the 
VaR model’s two most significant limitations: that it measures the risk of 
an individual financial institution in isolation, without factoring in 
systemic risk, and that its calculations are based on short-term data 
samples that reflect current rather than future market conditions.
131
  
 
 
 124. Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 465–67 (2009) (arguing that compensation 
conflicts explain, among other things, the failure of secondary managers to disclose the limitations of 
the VaR model to senior management); see also Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial 
Markets, supra note 46, at 261. 
 125. Cf. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse, supra note 124, at 460. 
 126. Id. at 468. 
 127. Id. at 469. 
 128. Cf. id. at 460.  
 129. For a description of the VaR model, see supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
 131. Tobias Adrian & Markus Brunnermeier, CoVaR, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. STAFF REPORTS 
NO. 348 (revised Sept. 2011), http://newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr348.pdf (proposing an 
alternate method for market regulators to measure risk, called conditional value at risk (CoVaR), 
designed to factor in systemic risk and also to take into account future risk by factoring in the 
institution’s size, leverage, maturity mismatch, and other relevant characteristics). 
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Human Processing Failure. I also have separately examined how to 
mitigate human thought processing failures.
132
 The problem here is 
fundamental to its core: the human brain’s limited ability to accurately 
correlate perceived and actual risk, and its susceptibility to discontinuities 
and misdirection. By increasing complexity, risk dispersion exacerbates 
these biases and limitations. Regulation nonetheless can be designed to 
make market participants more vigilant against these biases and 
limitations, especially when they are engaging in risk-related decisions. 
For example, the authority and compensation of a firm’s risk managers 
could be increased in order to attract managers with the nuanced cognition 
that is necessary to understand the complexity,
133
 and risk managers could 
be required to assess risk on a firm-wide, not compartmentalized, basis.
134
 
Regulators could also require market participants to inform them of risks 
that are not fully captured by internal models. Additionally, regulators 
could require market participants to qualitatively analyze risks that cannot 
be fully quantified.
135
 At the end of the day, though, human processing 
failures can only be mitigated, not eliminated. That makes the question of 
whether risk dispersion itself should be limited even more relevant.
136
  
2. Regulating the Collective Action Failures 
Risk dispersion also can create collective action failures—such as TOC 
failures and incentive failures—that cause second-order consequences. 
This Article next examines how regulation should be designed to help 
correct these failures. The following discussion focuses on regulation 
because firms are unmotivated to self-regulate against collective action 
failures and because these failures more often lead to second-order 
consequences. 
TOC Failure. TOC failure occurs because individual market 
participants are self-regarding when making risk-taking decisions, whereas 
those decisions can have externalities.
137
 The most direct way to correct 
this failure is to require market participants to internalize those 
 
 
 132. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 43. 
 133. See supra note 77–78 and accompanying text (describing that human processing failure). 
 134. Cf. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 165(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1429–30 (2010) (to be 
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(h)) (requiring certain publicly traded bank-holding or financial 
companies to establish board-level risk committees having enterprise-wide risk management 
responsibilities and including at least one risk management expert). 
 135. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 43. 
 136. For an examination of this question, see infra Part III.B.3. 
 137. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.  
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externalities. This could be done, for example, by regulation requiring at 
least systemically important market participants
138
 to contribute to a 
systemic risk fund.
139
 The fund could then be used as a source of bailout 
monies or as a source of market liquidity.
140
 Ideally, any such fund should 
be international to avoid anti-competitively “taxing” market participants in 
any given jurisdiction. 
 
 
 138. This Article does not purport to determine which market participants should be deemed to be 
systemically important. In a slightly different context, the Dodd-Frank Act effectively defines a 
systemically important market as “any bank holding company with total consolidated assets equal to or 
greater than $50 billion.” Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210(o)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1509 
(2010). Beyond this financial threshold, the Act differentiates between banks, which are automatically 
considered systemically important, and “nonbank financial companies,” which may be selected for 
supervision by the Board of Governors. Id. § 113(a)(1). In making its determination, the Board of 
Governors must consider (inter alia) whether “the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, 
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank financial company[] could pose a 
threat to the financial stability of the United States.” Id. Commentators have argued that additional 
factors should also tie into a determination of “systemic importance.” Professors Gordon and Muller 
argue, for example, that for purposes of contributing to a systemic risk fund, private hedge funds and 
money market funds should be deemed systemically important because they “depend on the stability 
of the financial sector for their daily activity.” Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting 
Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 
YALE J. ON REG. 151, 205 (2011). Of course, any definition of “systemically important” would almost 
certainly have to adjust over time to reflect the variable nature of the concept’s defining factors, from 
inflation’s effect on the $50 billion financial threshold to changing perceptions of systemic risk. 
Another consideration in settling upon a definition is that market participants may attempt to avoid a 
“systemically important” classification by reorganizing themselves to fall outside the definition. It is 
therefore important that the definition be broad enough to avoid being inappropriately gamed. On the 
other hand, any definition should encourage otherwise systemically important market participants to 
reorganize themselves to significantly reduce their systemic risk profiles. 
 139. Although this Article does not purport to determine how the contribution rate should be 
calibrated, some observations may be made. The contribution rate should presumably depend on a 
firm’s systemic importance, which in turn should be a function of at least two variables: the extent of 
the firm’s direct importance to other market participants (through, for example, its counterparty 
relationships), and the extent of the firm’s indirect importance to other market participants resulting 
from the degree of correlation of its assets with market assets. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 43. 
The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes regulators to create a “risk matrix” for this purpose, taking into 
account factors such as “economic conditions generally affecting financial companies” and “the risks 
presented by the financial company to the financial system.” Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 210(0)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1510–11 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(0)(4)). In analyzing 
the “risks presented” by a financial company, specific factors such as the company’s capital and 
liquidity that directly impact the “systemic risk load” should be considered to complete a risk-adjusted 
assessment of the firm’s appropriate contribution. Gordon & Muller, supra note 138, at 206. In the 
related context of the Basle III capital adequacy proposals and new leverage ratios, the Basel 
Committee has stated that “[s]ystemically important banks should have loss absorbing capacity beyond 
the standards [it has announced],” but it has not yet developed standards for such firms. Basel iii 
Accord: The New Basel iii Framework, BASEL III, http://www.basel-iii-accord.com/ (last visited Jan. 
8, 2012).  
 140. Cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 43 (arguing for creation of such a market liquidity 
provider of last resort and for a market-participant fund to support it); Gordon & Muller, supra note 
138.  
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A systemic risk fund funded by market participants not only can 
mitigate externalities resulting from TOC failure but also can help 
minimize the potential that market participants who believe they are too 
big to fail will engage in risky behavior. The too-big-to-fail problem is 
effectively an externality imposed on governments (and ultimately 
taxpayers) by market participants who engage in risky behavior. A 
privately funded systemic risk fund would help to internalize that 
externality. Furthermore, the ability of governments to require additional 
contributions to this type of fund should motivate fund contributors not 
only to monitor themselves but also to monitor each other to reduce the 
potential for risky behavior.
141
 Contributors could be further motivated to 
monitor if at least a portion of the fund, if unused, could be returned to 
them over time and also by requiring the fund, if sufficient levels are 
maintained, to pay a periodic rate of return in the form of interest to the 
contributors.
142
 If smaller fund contributors still had insufficient incentives 
to monitor, regulation could require establishment of a trade-type 
organization, funded by the contributors, that would monitor the fund on 
the contributors’ behalf.  
The bill that would become the Dodd-Frank Act
143
 originally included 
the concept of a systemic risk resolution fund, to be sourced by large 
banks and other systemically important financial institutions and used as a 
possible bailout mechanism in lieu of taxpayer funds.
144
 The concept was 
dropped after certain politicians alleged that it would “weaken market 
 
 
 141. Although it may have superficial appeal, I do not believe that regulation could address TOC 
failure by requiring market participants who disperse risk to align their interests with those of society. 
The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, attempts such an alignment by requiring securitization sellers to 
retain risk (or, more colloquially, to keep “skin in the game”) in the form of at least a 5 percent credit 
risk for certain assets. § 15G(c)(1)(b)(i). However even if a larger percentage of risk were retained, 
such retention would only mitigate conflicts between the parties retaining some risk and those taking 
on the majority of the risk. The TOC is ultimately a conflict between financial-market participants and 
non-financial-market participants, the latter bearing the burden of externalized risk in a systemic 
collapse of the financial system. 
 142. Cf. Eric Dash, Bank Losses Drain Deposit Fund, F.D.I.C. Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2009, at B3 (explaining that the amount of money in the government’s deposit insurance fund rises and 
falls with the success of its contributors). The fund established by the IMF to help bail out defaulting 
member-nations, for example, pays a periodic rate of return to the contributing nations. Steven L. 
Schwarcz, ‘Idiot’s Guide’ to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1195–96 (2004). 
Unfortunately, though, the IMF pays those nations less than a market rate of interest on their 
contributions. Id. at 1196. The FDIC contribution fund works somewhat in this manner.  
 143. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 210(n) (2010). 
 144. Finance-Overhaul Bill Would Reshape Wall Street, BLOOMBERG.COM (MAY 20, 2010, 11:40 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-21/u-s-financial-overhaul-legislation-would-reshape-
wall-street-washington.html (reporting that the Senate committee’s proposal for a $50 billion 
resolution fund, paid for by the financial industry, was removed from the Senate bill). 
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discipline.”145 That view is somewhat incongruous given that, as discussed 
above, a systemic risk fund should actually have the opposite effect, 
minimizing the moral hazard potential of firms that believe they are too 
big to fail.
146
 
More recently, the European Commission has been contemplating the 
possibility of a systemic risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax 
the financial sector.
147
 Although the issue of the ultimate use of the tax 
revenues is currently unresolved,
148
 news reports indicate that an originally 
contemplated use was for “funds [that] could be tapped to resolve bank 
failures in an orderly fashion” and “prevent fire sales of assets.”149 The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) appears to be using the European 
Commission’s tax proposal as a platform to announce, “new taxes on 
banks [are] needed to provide an insurance fund for future financial 
meltdowns and to curb excessive risktaking.”150 Whatever the ultimate use 
of tax revenues, the European Commission recognizes that to avoid 
making the EU financial sector uncompetitive, any such tax “should be 
applied in all financial centres.”151  
 
 
 145. Id. Although Dodd-Frank contemplates possible ex post funding of a systemic risk fund, 
query whether any such fund could be created quickly enough to be effective or even whether financial 
institutions would be able to provide such funding at the time of systemic crisis. Cf. Gordon & Muller, 
supra note 138 (making this argument). 
 146. See John Armour, Bank Resolution Regimes: Designing the Right Model? 24 (Aug. 3, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that a resolution fund that is paid for by 
systemically important financial institutions “has the potential greatly to reduce the problems of moral 
hazard associated with bailouts. By placing the responsibility on the shoulders of financial institutions, 
it generates a degree of potential cross-monitoring, with firms having incentives to encourage each 
other not to place the others at risk.”).  
 147. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Taxation of the Financial Sector, COM (2010) 549 final (July 10, 2010), http://www.google.com/url? 
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Feur-lex 
.europa.eu%2FLexUriServ%2FLexUriServ.do%3Furi%3DCOM%3A2010%3A0549%3AFIN%3
AEN%3APDF&ei=CGbJTqmhGOnnsQKssYlA&usg=AFQjCNFzn8JwjknH7ZYVzp_v_Sowc41
H3 w&sig2=7wVfstLqb1D65TB_qX_o7w.  
 148. Id. at 2 (describing possible uses as including “financ[ing] development cooperation, 
help[ing] developing countries combat climate change[,] and contribut[ing] to the EU budget”). A 
press release issued by the European Commission explains that “[a]ny debate on what should be done 
with the revenue would come much later. Ultimately, it is for [EU] Member States to agree on how 
such revenue would be spent.”). Press Release, European Commission, Questions and Answers: 
Financial Sector Taxation (Oct. 7, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do 
?reference=MEMO/10/477&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 149. “Polluter Parp” Principle for Banks, EUROPEAN COMM’N (May 26, 2010), http://ec 
.europa.eu/news/economy/100526_en.htm. 
 150. Larry Elliott & Jill Treanor, IMF: Tax Banks or Risk Renewed Crisis, THEGUARDIAN.COM 
(Oct. 7, 2010, 3:33 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/oct/07/imf-strausskahn-banks-
crisis-warning (paraphrasing an announcement by IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn). 
 151. European Commission, supra note 147, at 6; see also Sarah Collins, Trichet: Transaction 
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Incentive Failure. The most obvious way to address incentive failure 
would be to require investments and other financial products to be more 
standardized, so that market participants do not need to engage in as much 
due diligence.
152
 Standardization can make financial products more 
cognizable,
153
 thereby reducing due diligence costs. The overall economic 
impact of standardization is unclear, though, because standardization can 
interfere with the ability of parties to achieve the efficiencies that arise 
when firms issue securities tailored to particular needs of investors.
154
 
Moreover, standardization is likely to face opposition by market 
participants because commoditizing financial products reduces 
profitability.
155
 It is therefore preferable to address incentive failure 
through means other than standardization. 
Another potential approach would be to centralize the exercise of due 
diligence, thereby concentrating expertise. Centralization can produce cost 
efficiencies in the production of research and analysis through 
specialization and economies of scale.
156
 But recent experience with rating 
agencies, which are a type of centralization, raises questions as to the 
 
 
Tax “Not Advisable,” EUROPOLITICS (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.europolitics.info/trichet-transaction-
tax-not-advisable-art282386-8.html (reporting that European Central Bank President Jean-Claude 
Trichet is concerned that a unilateral financial sector tax by the EU “would force the financial sector 
out of Europe” and that although Trichet observes that any such tax “‘has to be done on a global level,’ 
currently there is ‘enormous opposition to a global tax, especially from the US, Canada and 
Australia’”). 
 152. Incentive failure should be distinguished from cases where decisions by market participants 
to invest in or underwrite innovative types of securities are not market failures, but instead represent a 
market learning process. Markets develop by a process of learning, and any new financial instrument 
can have problems because information may be insufficient. See, e.g., Charles R. Hickson et al., 
Corporation or Limited Liability Company, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD TRADE SINCE 1450 (John J. 
McCusker ed., 2005) (discussing market problems resulting from the advent of the joint-stock 
corporation). 
 153. Cf. Scott Moss, Technology and Vertical Integration in Exchange, in AN ECONOMIC THEORY 
OF BUSINESS STRATEGY (1981), available at http://www.scott.moss.name/bus-strat/chapter6/ch6.html 
(explaining how commodities can be made more “cognizable”). 
 154. Compare Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 46, at 241 
n.165 and accompanying text (arguing that regulatory attempts to limit uncertainty by standardizing 
transactions and financial products would likely have unintended negative consequences) with Judge, 
supra note 47 (arguing that standardization could reduce the informational burden on investors, 
facilitate coordination in the face of changed circumstances, and make it easier for investors to 
compare securities issued in different transactions) and NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS 
ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 193–94 (2010) (examining effect of 
increasing standardization in securitization). 
 155. See, e.g., Joseph R. Mason, Regulating for Financial System Development, Financial 
Institutions Stability, and Financial Innovation, in BANK OF IT. 4 (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.banca 
ditalia.it/studiricerche/convegni/atti/Financial_Market_Regulation/session_c2/Mason.pdf (arguing that 
banks may oppose greater standardization because standardization tends to reduce profit margins). 
 156. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 43.  
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efficacy and reliability of centralization.
157
 As an alternative to the 
centralization of due diligence, regulation could set minimum standards 
under which market participants themselves must perform due diligence—
the goal being to prevent market participants from making investments 
that they do not adequately understand or cannot adequately monitor. 
Imposing regulatory standards can backfire, though. They may be too 
vague to be of much use, as has been argued, for example, of the “prudent 
banking” standard.158 Similarly, regulatory standards may be so detailed 
that they impair efficient operations.
159
  
 
 
 157. Cf., e.g., Jerome S. Fons & Frank Partnoy, Op-Ed., Rated F for Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
16, 2009, at A23. The analogy with centralizing due diligence is limited, however, because rating 
agencies have not historically engaged in due diligence, focusing solely on risk assessment from 
information provided. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating 
Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002). The Dodd-Frank Act now requires a degree of due 
diligence from rating agencies, including disclosure of any third parties that are performing due 
diligence efforts. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872–83 (2010); see 
also SEN. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK 
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1, 10, http://banking.senate.gov/public/_ 
files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf (last visited Jan. 
5, 2012). 
 158. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H545 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski) 
(noting opposition to H.R. 3763, the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Transparency Act, because “much of the bill’s language is simply too vague to ensure that essential 
standards for effective oversight will be met”); Charles Calomiris, Prudential Bank Regulation: 
What’s Broke and How to Fix It, DEFINING IDEAS (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.hoover.org/ 
publications/defining-ideas/article/5612 (observing that the “prudential regulation of commercial 
banks and investment banks has proven to be ineffective”); Martinez Soledad, Martinez Peria & Sergio 
L. Schmukler, Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, 
and Banking Crises, 56 J. FIN. 1029 (2001) (same); cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON 
LAW 112 (1909) (referring to a “prudent man” standard as a “vague” test of care). Indeed, the entire 
“principles versus rules” debate turns on the tension between standards that are too vague and rules 
that are too detailed and inflexible. Cf. Kern Alexander, Principles v. Rules in Financial Regulation: 
Re-assessing the Balance in the Credit Crisis Symposium at Cambridge University, 10–11 April 2008, 
10 EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L. REV. 169, 169 (2009) (discussing concerns that the UK Financial Services 
Authority’s principles-based-regulation approach to financial regulation “contributed significantly to 
regulatory failure”). Lawrence Baxter proposes that a “fiduciary duty owed directly to the federal 
regulators would have the effect of enhancing the importance of federal law and agency discretion in 
the domain of banking regulation.” Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking 
Regulation, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 9 (1993). 
 159. See, e.g., ADIL E. SHAMOO & DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH 147 
(2003) (noting that in “[p]olicies pertaining to the regulation of finance . . . it is presumed that 
excessive regulations impede competition, efficiency, and consumer choice and result in higher costs 
for services and products.”); Xavier Freixas & Anthony M. Santomero, An Overall Perspective on 
Banking Regulation 11 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 02-1, Feb. 2002), 
available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2002/ 
wp02-1.pdf (discussing how regulatory constraints can “have ‘general equilibrium’ effects that . . . 
differ from [effects] expected at the individual level”); Luigi Guiso et al., The Cost of Banking 
Regulation 22 (EUI, Working Paper ECO 2007/43, 2007), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/ 
bitstream/handle/1814/7497/ECO-2007-43.pdf?sequence=1 (analyzing bank regulation throughout the 
world and concluding that “there is little evidence of its welfare effects”); Task Force for the 
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Management-based (sometimes called process-based) regulation also 
has the potential to help reduce incentive failure by requiring market 
participants to develop their own individualized, internal risk-management 
processes.
160
 Certain regulatory approaches already proposed to mitigate 
human processing failures exemplify management-based approaches.
161
 
For example, increasing the authority and independence of risk managers 
could mitigate human processing failure by attracting managers of 
sufficiently nuanced cognition to understand the complexity.
162
 This 
approach could also help to reduce incentive failure by enabling risk 
managers to veto investments that promise short-term profits but carry 
long-term risk.
163
 Management-based approaches might not be successful, 
however, when the behavior that leads to incentive failure is (as may often 
be the case) truly rational from an individual market participant’s 
standpoint—such as when the market participant needs to make the 
investment to remain competitive, at least in the short run.
164
  
In short, regulation can limit the prevalence of, but probably cannot 
completely eliminate, incentive failure.  
3. Limiting Risk Dispersion 
Because regulatory responses cannot fully solve the problem of 
incentive failure, the next inquiry is whether risk dispersion itself should 
be limited. In order to motivate monitoring, for example, should regulation 
require, at least for some types of large issuances of complex debt 
securities, that each class of securities have a minimum unhedged position 
held by a single sophisticated investor?
165
 To answer this, one would need 
 
 
Implementation of the Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe, Financing 
Environmental Protection in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA): Background 
Report, ¶ 24, ENVIRONMENT FOR EUROPE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE (May 21–23, 2003), http:// 
www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/30/5/2511390.pdf (observing that the statements of policy objectives for the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe were “either too general and vague or—on the 
contrary—too specific and too long . . . with little sense of priority or implementability”). 
 160. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003) (examining management-
based regulation and its advantages and disadvantages); cf. Kenneth Bamberger, Technologies of 
Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 704–14, 717–22 (2010) 
(arguing that the use of technology can obscure the uncertainty of hazards); id. at 722–38 (suggesting 
specific reform measures, including predicting future risks from feedback between predictions and 
experience rather than from the introduction of sophisticated predictive methodologies).  
 161. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Cf. supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 164. See id. (presenting that example). 
 165. This Article does not purport to provide specificity of such regulation, except to observe that 
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to balance the benefits of risk dispersion with its potential costs,
166
 
offsetting the costs of regulation. That balance, however, would ultimately 
be empirical. 
It nonetheless should be observed that regulation limiting risk 
dispersion can have significant costs. The prior analysis of standardization, 
which itself can be seen as a form of regulatory limitation, suggests that 
limiting risk dispersion can interfere with the ability of parties to achieve 
negotiated market efficiencies.
167
 Another cost of limiting risk dispersion 
is the potential for regulatory arbitrage—the designing of transactions to 
try to “reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential 
regulations or laws.”168 If market participants are able to structure 
transactions that appear to disperse more risk than is actually dispersed, 
the end result could be socially undesirable. The regulatory limitations 
would be effectively bypassed, but the overall transaction costs would rise 
due to the expenses of lawyers and other advisors hired for that purpose. 
Moreover, although it has not been clearly quantified, some degree of risk 
dispersion can diffuse financial instability.
169
 Limiting risk dispersion to 
 
 
(i) the types and amounts of regulated issuances should be based on potential second-order 
consequences, and (ii) the amounts of the minimum unhedged positions should be based on investor 
motivational studies. 
 166. Cf. Douglas W. Elmendorf, Notes on Policy Responses to the Subprime Mortgage 
Unraveling, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/ 
2007/09subprimemortgageunravelling/09useconomics_elmendorf.pdf; Darrell Duffie, Innovations in 
Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability 1–2 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working 
Paper No. 255, 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work255.pdf?noframes=1 (arguing that 
instruments that transfer credit risk improve financial stability by dispersing risk among investors). 
Also, it is unclear whether limiting risk dispersion would help protect against the scenario in which 
investors mistakenly think that they have effectively diversified their investments and therefore will 
not protect against the risk. Professsor Krawiec indeed argues that it is better to know that one has risk 
and to protect against it, than to fail to protect against risk that one mistakenly thinks has been 
addressed. See Kimberly Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 130 (2009) 
(arguing that the Basel Committee’s solution for addressing operational risk, an enforced self-
regulatory regime, is unlikely to substantially alter financial institutions’ ability to successfully manage 
operational risk, thereby posing the danger of high costs, a false sense of security, and perverse 
incentives). 
 167. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 168. Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 
211, 227 (1997). 
 169. See, e.g., E.P. DAVIS, DEBT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, AND SYSTEMIC RISK 272 (1992) 
(observing that diversifying risk “more widely across the financial system, may help to diffuse 
financial instability and prevent systemic risk.”); Rodrigo Cifuentes et al., Liquidity Risk and 
Contagion 28 (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 264, 2005), available at http://www.bankofengland 
.co.uk/publications/workingpapers/wp264.pdf (finding that a credit structure diversified among two or 
three banks can trigger, in the case of a bank’s default, significant systemic contagion to other banks, 
whereas that “contagion disappears when the number of interlinkages is high enough to allow banks to 
stand the losses without selling illiquid assets”); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 16, at 221 
(arguing that diversification of risk reduces the likelihood that a default will cause any given market 
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below that indefinite level could therefore increase instability. Because of 
these costs, regulators should not, at least without compelling reason and a 
clear understanding of costs and benefits,
170
 limit risk dispersion.
171
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Risk dispersion, which is widespread in modern finance, can create 
benefits such as investment diversification and more efficient allocation of 
risk. Sometimes, however, it can lead to market failures, causing investors 
and other market participants to underestimate and under-protect against 
(i.e., marginalize) risk. Marginalization of risk can result in first-order 
consequences, harming the market participants themselves, and also in 
second-order consequences, harming third parties.  
Regulating risk dispersion that causes only first-order consequences 
would likely be inefficient because market participants themselves should 
want to protect against those consequences. But regulating risk dispersion 
that causes second-order consequences could well be appropriate, and 
indeed, parallels the traditional regulatory focus of government.  
The second-order consequences of risk dispersion arise primarily from 
two types of collective action failures. The first is a form of tragedy of the 
commons (a “TOC failure”) in which the benefits of exploiting finite 
capital resources accrue to individual market participants, each of whom is 
motivated to maximize use of the resource, whereas the costs of 
exploitation are distributed more widely. The potential for a TOC failure 
exists regardless of—but can be greatly exacerbated by—risk dispersion. 
The second type of collective action failure is akin to a tragedy of the 
anticommons:
172
 risk can be so widely dispersed that rational market 
participants individually lack the incentive to monitor it. 
 
 
participant to fail and mitigates the impact of any such failure on other market participants); cf. Hyun 
Song Shin, Securitisation and Financial Stability, 119 ECON. J. 309, 331 (2009) (observing that 
securitization increases financial stability by increasing the credit supply to end-users). 
 170. A compromise approach might be to limit only the most highly complex risk-dispersing 
transactions, like ABS CDO, but a question then arises as to how to draw the line. 
 171. At least until the Dodd-Frank Act, regulatory philosophy in the United States had been 
shying away from prohibiting categories of transactions. For example, the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 lifted the ban on over-the-counter derivatives and also eliminated the ban 
on single security futures contracts. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–
554, 114 Stat. 2763A–365 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
 172. In property law, an anticommons problem arises when a scarce resource has too many 
owners with the right to exclude others; no individual owner then has an effective privilege of use, and 
the resource becomes prone to underuse. See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). Similarly, when a class of securities has too many diverse investors, no 
single investor has a sufficient amount at risk to individually motivate monitoring. The tragedy of the 
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This Article argues that TOC failure can be addressed by regulation 
requiring systemically important market participants to contribute to a 
systemic risk fund, which could then be used as a source of bailout monies 
or market liquidity. This regulatory requirement would not only mitigate 
externalities but also would help to minimize the potential that market 
participants who believe they are too big to fail will engage in risky 
behavior.  
The problem of incentive failure is harder to solve, and indeed all 
regulatory responses appear to be second best. Imperfect solutions may 
well be preferable to limiting risk dispersion, however, because any such 
limitation could inadvertently increase the potential for regulatory 
arbitrage, increase financial instability, and impair the ability of parties to 
achieve negotiated market efficiencies. 
 
 
anticommons is not a perfect analogy, however, because marginalization of risk does not necessarily 
involve the right to exclude others. Perhaps a more apt analogy might be the collective action problem 
of “rational apathy.” See, e.g., Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 605, 622–25 (2007) (discussing that problem). 
 
